网络借贷中借款人履约的逆向激励——基于“人人贷”数据的经验证据Reverse Incentive on Borrowers' Self-fulfillment in Internet Lending:An Empirical Study Using “RenRen Dai” Data
马源聪;洪灏琪;林丽琼;
摘要(Abstract):
在逆向选择与道德风险问题凸显的网贷行业,通过将借款人信用额度与履约情况关联的方式引入动态激励机制被认为是网贷公司促进信贷契约自我实施的重要手段,但近年来频发的"套路贷"问题使我们有必要重新审视该制度的有效性。为检验网贷行业中动态激励机制的有效性,文章选取"人人贷"公司借款数据,构建分数反应回归模型(Fractional Response Regression),实证分析借款者信用额度变化对借款者自我履约行为的影响。研究发现:(1)动态激励机制在网络借款活动中的应用产生了不利于缓解违约风险问题的"逆向激励"效应;(2)与普通借款者相比,资质优良的借款者未表现出更低的违约可能,动态激励机制亦对其产生了显著的"逆向激励"效果;(3)网贷行业中存在过度借债与"借新还旧"行为,存在该行为的借款者受"逆向激励"影响更大,违约率更高。本研究的发现为认识和评价动态激励机制在网贷行业中的应用提供了新证据,也为有关监管部门及网贷平台防控网贷风险提供了经验支持。
关键词(KeyWords): 动态激励机制;逆向激励;信用额度;声誉效应
基金项目(Foundation): 国家社科基金一般项目(19BJY162)
作者(Author): 马源聪;洪灏琪;林丽琼;
Email:
DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.2020.05.005
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- (1)2015年7月18日央行、财政部陆续发布《关于促进互联网金融健康发展的指导意见》,对P2P等互联网金融行业制定了纲领性的指导措施;12月28日《网络借贷信息中介机构业务活动管理暂行办法(征求意见稿)》出台,旨在公开征求社会大众意见;2016年的政府工作报告则明确提出要规范发展互联网金融,互联网金融行业的规范管理步伐进一步加快。
- (1)“人人贷”平台规定,最高借贷额度为20万元。
- (1)因篇幅限制,本文未呈现稳健性检验的回归结果,若读者有兴趣可向作者索取。