郑丹辉;韩晓燕;李新春;

• 1:中山大学管理学院
• 2:中山大学中国家族企业研究中心

摘要(Abstract)：

组织冗余对风险投资活动的作用机制目前尚不明晰,有必要结合具体情境进行讨论。文章利用我国147家民营高科技上市公司2008-2010年数据,考察了组织冗余与民营企业风险投资活动之间的关系以及创始人控制对两者关系的调节作用。研究发现,组织冗余与民营上市公司风险投资活动之间呈"倒U形"关系,创始人及其家族控制显著促进了民营企业在风险投资活动上的冗余资源配置。文章研究结论表明,冗余资源对民营企业风险投资活动来说是一把"双刃剑",创始人及其家族对民营企业的心理所有权发挥了重要作用,使企业战略决策更具有长期导向性。

关键词(KeyWords)： 企业风险投资;已吸收冗余;未吸收冗余;创始人控制

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金项目(71232009、71172167);; 中山大学“985工程”三期项目“中国家族企业研究创新基地”;; 广东省高等学校珠江学者岗位计划的资助

作者(Author): 郑丹辉;韩晓燕;李新春;

Email:

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.2013.05.007

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