李建标;殷西乐;任雪;

• 1:南开大学中国公司治理研究院
• 2:南开大学商学院
• 3:国网英大国际控股集团有限公司财务资产部

摘要(Abstract)：

为考察审计参与人的博弈过程及其结果,文章构建了涉及管理者和审计师等局中人的博弈模型,在此基础上引入审计师声誉机制和内部监督机制,利用比较制度实验经济学的方法对比了两种机制对管理者和审计师行为的影响及其对审计质量的改善效果。研究发现:(1)基准实验中管理者更多地选择较高的舞弊水平,而审计师更多地选择较高的审计力度,实现了福利水平最劣的均衡结果;(2)偏好性的声誉机制对审计质量的改善效果不显著,内部监督机制从根本上减少了舞弊的发生,显著地改善了审计质量;(3)审计力度在内部监督机制与审计质量之间存在完全中介效应。文章对于如何通过治理机制来有效地提高审计质量具有一定的参考价值。

关键词(KeyWords)： 审计质量;声誉;内部监督;比较制度实验;中介效应

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金项目(71372094,71132001,71172068,71533002)

作者(Author): 李建标;殷西乐;任雪;

Email:

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.2015.10.011

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• 1目前我国关于审计质量的实验研究主要是以注册会计师为实验参与者。专业人士作为实验参与者,固然有利于对实验任务的准确理解,但也存在一些弊端:一是他们容易受到个人经验的影响而忽略或无法适应实验中的规则;二是实验所给予的报酬对他们而言并不重要,因此实验的价值诱导条件不易满足。
• 1Hayes设计了用于中介效应分析的Bootsrap程序插件,可以分析存在多个中介变量、多步中介效应以及有调节的中介效应等复杂情况,其中,PROCESS插件适用于自变量为连续变量,MEDIATE插件适用于自变量为多类别分类变量。