李韵;丁林峰;

• 1:美国麻省大学经济学系
• 2:上海财经大学经济学院

摘要(Abstract)：

员工持股计划(ESOP)作为一种企业发展的内部激励方式和分配形式在美国得到了广泛关注和充分运用;而员工持股计划是否适应中国国情,是否在本质上与我国的社会主义性质相吻合,这都需要进一步的理论说明和实证检验。文章基于员工持股计划的集体激励本质特性,从累积性、吸入性和异质性三个层面,构建了一个员工持股计划作用于企业创新的理论框架,并利用2007-2017年沪深两市相关上市公司的样本数据进行实证检验,结果表明:在我国,员工持股计划具有显著的创新激励效果,但对企业的创新影响并不是线性增加,而是呈现出"U"形的累积效应关系。进一步的讨论发现,员工持股计划对于创新性劳动的吸引力比较显著,且其创新激励效应在国有企业和高新技术企业中比较显著。文章对于如何推进员工持股计划在我国企业的创新实践中加以应用,以及如何落实社会主义基本分配制度的有效实现具有重要的政策启示。

关键词(KeyWords)： 员工持股;企业创新;集体激励;累积创新力

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation):

作者(Author): 李韵;丁林峰;

Email:

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.2020.07.003

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• (1)资料来源：https://www.nceo.org/articles/employee-ownership-by-the-numbers。
• (2)数据来源：东方财富（Choice）数据库。
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• (1)本文在理论分析中会展开讨论。
• (1)引自马克思、恩格斯：《马克思恩格斯全集》（第1卷），人民出版社2000年版，第378页、第537-538页。
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• (1)限于篇幅，本文没有汇报Probit的回归结果，备索。
• (2)限于篇幅，本文没有汇报具体的匹配结果，备索。
• (1)限于篇幅，本文省略了稳健性检验的具体过程和结果，备索。